Just look at France, he said, where most voters on Sunday rejected the extreme right after a “wake-up call” in the first round of voting late last month.

POLITICO Magazine spoke with Støre ahead of the NATO summit in Washington this week about Norway’s surge in defense spending and how he hopes to navigate this moment of extreme political uncertainty in Europe and North America.

During Donald Trump’s presidency, Støre said, countries like his worked hard to persuade Trump of NATO’s value. Norway may be well positioned to make that case to Trump if he returns to the White House.

Støre recently led the Norwegian government to enact a 12-year, $156 billion defense-spending blueprint — a dollar figure likely to please Trump. More immediately, Støre said, it’s a policy that commands broad support across the Norwegian political spectrum.

“Parties who would normally not join the consensus like this, for domestic reasons, have joined the consensus,” Støre said. “I think that is because they read the electorate.”

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Norway is a case study in rising to the moment and making big investments in defense. Do you see that as a permanent shift in Norway’s military and manufacturing role, or is it particularly necessary just in this specific moment when Russia is so threatening?

At present, we have complete support in parliament for our Ukrainian five-year package of support, which has gathered support from left to right. Our defense plan, which is now pretty detailed until 2036, also has support from all parties. So, no matter who will be in the next government, we will be committed to fulfilling that plan.

It is of course influenced by what we learned from Ukraine — what we learned from a modern invasion by a very voluminous army, the Russian army. We don’t see an immediate threat of that sort toward Norway, but any country planning for its own defense has to draw on these lessons.

The most expensive part of what we’re going to do is our naval capacity, in terms of new submarines, new frigates and also new vessels which will be needed to play our role in these northern waters.

Norway’s security will always be a combination of our own defense capacity — we already have started these investments — and our NATO participation, which is critically important for Norway’s security. For that to be legitimate and trustworthy, we need to do our part.

How much do you worry about the durability of the alliance when you see the surge of the far right in France — not as strong as we expected, but still a very strong anti-NATO message there — or the presence of Donald Trump in the United States?

You have to start from the point of departure that we are dealing with democracies here. This is not a club of autocratic states, where you have prescriptive statements on how the world looks. You’re going to have different national settings, and NATO has had that since 1949. We even had years where you had members of NATO that were not purely democratic — Spain and Portugal under dictatorship, for example.

NATO has been successful at proving its value to all member states since 1949. I believe for any [American] administration, there are obvious advantages to having 31 of the world’s most modern states as your close and committed allies, who will invest in technology, stay united politically and support you on the big international issues.

I would assume that part of what happened in France this last week was that the electorate had a wake-up call — that some significant issues are at stake right now, and you don’t play with an alliance, solidarity and collective security. I think it’s also interesting that you have a major shift in the U.K., but [NATO] is the constant. What U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer really confirmed ahead of the election was that the U.K. will deliver on its 2.5 percent pledge [to expand defense spending], they will modernize their capabilities, and they will stay committed to Ukraine.

Altogether, I think that the unifying forces inside NATO are much stronger than the divisive forces.

We just published a special report yesterday on how American allies are preparing for the possibility of a Trump presidency. I wonder how much time you spend thinking through the implications of a second Trump administration.

Like most other countries, we go through what we know, and we make some considerations about what we don’t know and where we may have questions. We prepare our diplomats to be good readers of the political environment — talking to people, making connections. But I’ll tell you what: At the end of that analysis, I come up with pretty much the same answer, should it be a continued Biden administration or a new Trump administration. There are two main lessons.

One is that Europe has to take a greater responsibility inside NATO. And we are, I think, showing how we do that by significantly investing. Secondly, I think what you have to do in any alliance is to prove the relevance for why we are doing this together. During the first Trump administration, I think countries like Norway and the Netherlands and Denmark were pretty good at explaining why it made sense to be in this alliance together. You have to make an effort to do that.

No matter what administration comes out of that election, if you look at the cards you’re dealt with, I think having the NATO card is a very strong hand.

I wonder how closely you’ve followed President Biden’s political challenges lately and just how much confidence you have in him as a leader right now.

We all follow American campaigns with lots of interest. I can only say that we’ve had excellent relations with the Biden administration, with the president himself, who I think is quite familiar with what the Nordic countries are, what they represent, what we have to offer. We have a very close dialogue with his national security team.

You said before that you believe what happened in the French election, at least in part, is that voters really focused on the seriousness of the choice in front of them. Could you elaborate on that? When you see this surge of support for the far right in the European Parliament elections, and then at home, many more reservations about electing the far right — what’s your assessment of why that happens?

I think that parties from the right to the left have their different perspectives on how to meet contemporary challenges. If you go to the far left and far right, I believe that the perspectives simply don’t hold. They can be dangerous because they create illusions about making complicated things simple.

But the surge of the populist right is obviously a challenge to those parties who have not been able to retain the trust and support of the electorate. All countries in Europe have experienced that.

I think what French President Emmanuel Macron achieved by calling these elections was to challenge the French. To say, “You really have to take the position. You know, you gave a large vote to the far right at the European elections. Now I want to challenge you.”

And that ended differently. The far right came out third.

It’s not going to be easy in France. But the French will now face something which is a bit more European. You will have to spend some time to find the majority and find a prime minister who can command that majority. It took the Netherlands almost six months to negotiate a new government. In other countries, that takes some time. And now the French have to go through this.

If we who belong to the center right or center left cannot provide people with security, jobs and welfare, we will be challenged by either the far right or far left. I think that’s how it works.