Power in the USA
Our average daily energy consumption has been climbing steadily for decades.
Second only to China, the U.S. relies heavily on complex systems to keep our lights on.
To satisfy the huge demand, we have more than 9,000 power plants across the country.
Power plants generate electricity and send it to transformers.
Transformers convert electric currents to voltages high enough to be sent long distances across high-voltage power lines.
Speaking of power lines, the U.S. has a lot of them: there are about 160 million miles of high-voltage lines in the continental U.S.
After traveling along high-voltage lines, power arrives at substations.
Substations lower the voltage so it can be carried by distribution lines.
Distribution lines then deliver electricity to homes and businesses.
When each component works as intended, the grid successfully delivers power to hundreds of millions of Americans.
However, extreme heat and deep freezes are stretching the grid’s ability to respond to the unpredictable demands of climate change.
After a Texas freeze in 2011, power plant operators were asked to winterize. Too few made voluntary changes and were unprepared when temperatures plunged in February leaving four million Texans without power.
Rolling blackouts prevented total collapse of the Texas system. Wholesale prices jumped from $20 to $9,000 per megawatt hour. Most of Texas was left in the dark.
At least 111 people died in the storm, most from hypothermia.
Texas was operating its own power grid, unconnected to neighboring systems. There was no way to get power from other states.
Texas is the only state in the country served primarily by an independent grid. In addition to the three major divisions, two smaller interconnections serve Alaska and Quebec.
Each interconnection contains the power infrastructure that we learned about earlier: power generating plants, transformers, high-voltage power lines, substations and distribution lines.
This infrastructure is maintained by about 100 balancing authorities, usually electric companies or nonprofit organizations. The U.S. once had thousands of individual grids, but operators realized they could increase reliability if they connected their systems.
Many local operators combined into Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) to coordinate production and transmission across larger areas. The main benefit of joining is a bigger pool of power to pull from, increasing efficiency and lowering costs.
One RTO, the Southern Power Pool (SPP), played a critical role in that deadly February storm, helping other states keep the lights on as Texas succumbed to a deadly outage.
As temperatures began to plummet, SPP alerted members, asking them to conserve resources in order to ensure supply could safely meet demands.
And as the weather quickly worsened, the RTO drew upon reserves and started controlled outages to prevent system collapse.
It was a success. And over the past few months, several private power companies in the Western Interconnection have expressed interest in joining the SPP.
A deadly failure and near collapse in Texas exposed weaknesses of the U.S. power grid’s ability to respond to extreme weather and climate change. President Joe Biden unveiled a $2 trillion plan to prepare it for the future.
This is how it all works:
Our average daily energy consumption has climbed steadily for decades. Second only to China, the USA relies heavily on complex systems to keep our lights on. To satisfy the huge demand, we have more than 9,000 power plants generating electricity across the country.
Power plants generate electricity and send it to transformers. Transformers convert electric currents to voltages high enough to be sent long distances across high-voltage power lines.
Speaking of power lines, there are a lot of them – about 160 million miles of high-voltage transmission lines in the continental USA.
After traveling across the high-voltage lines, power arrives at substations that lower the voltage. Distribution lines then deliver electricity to homes and businesses.
When each component works as intended, the grid successfully delivers power to hundreds of millions of Americans.
However, extreme heat and deep freezes stretch the grid’s ability to respond to the unpredictable demands of climate change.
After a Texas freeze in 2011, power plant operators were asked to winterize. Too few made voluntary changes and were unprepared when temperatures plunged in February, leaving 4 million Texans without power.
Rolling blackouts prevented total collapse of the Texas system. Wholesale prices jumped from $20 to $9,000 per megawatt hour. Most of Texas was left in the dark.
At least 111 people died, most succumbing to hypothermia. Texas was on its own power grid, so there was no way for their neighbors to help them out.
Texas was operating its own power grid, unconnected to neighboring systems. There was no way to get power from other states.
Texas is the only state in the country served primarily by an independent grid. In addition to the three major divisions, two smaller interconnections serve Alaska and Quebec.
Each interconnection contains the power infrastructure that we learned about earlier: power generating plants, transformers, high-voltage power lines, substations and distribution lines.
This infrastructure is maintained by balancing authorities, usually electric companies or nonprofit organizations. The USA has about 100 balancing authorities.
The USA once had thousands of individual grids, but operators realized they could increase reliability if they connected their systems.
Many operators combined into Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) to coordinate production and transmission across larger areas. The main benefit of joining is a bigger pool of power to pull from, increasing efficiency and lowering costs.
One RTO, the Southern Power Pool (SPP), played a big role in helping several states keep the lights on, even as Texas succumbed to that deadly outage in February.
As temperatures plummeted, SPP alerted power generators, marketers and power providers to conserve resources to ensure supply could safely meet demands.
As the weather quickly worsened, the RTO drew upon all of its available electric capacity, imported limited amounts of energy from neighboring RTOs and implemented brief controlled outages on Feb. 15 and 16 to prevent system collapse.
Over the past few months, several private power companies in the Western Interconnection have expressed interest in joining the SPP.
How did it all get to be this way?
To understand grid regulation, we need to start back in the late 1800s when the first electricity generating stations started popping up in cities, and electricity soon became a necessity for city infrastructure and a commodity in homes.
Municipally owned utilities operated public infrastructure such as streetlights and trolley lines, while privately owned utilities controlled the rest.
Since it would be redundant for several power transmission lines to exist next to each other, the electricity market became a natural monopoly. States established utility commissions in 1907 to regulate rates.
In 1920, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) was established to issue hydroelectric licenses for developing generators. In 1935, the Public Utility Holding Act gave the FPC regulating authority over interstate, wholesale transmission and sales of electricity.
By 1962, several utilities banded together to form larger power interconnections that encompassed multiple regions, and the North American Power Systems Interconnection Committee (NAPSIC) was formed, an informal, voluntary organization to oversee the operation of interconnections.
A large power blackout in 1965 in the Northeast prompted the formation of NAPSIC's successor, the North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) in 1968, which would more formally oversee grid operations across the continent.
NERC established regional reliability councils that oversee regional grid operations, and they set reliability standards that all bulk electricity operations must abide by.
In 1977, the FPC became the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) when the Department of Energy was created.
In 1996 and 1999, FERC issued Orders 888 and 2000 that allowed for the creation of Independent System Operators (ISOs) and RTOs. All RTOs are also ISOs, which function as impartial organizations that make sure the grid remains open and equally accessible.
Why is Texas different?
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), operator of the Texas power grid, became the first ISO in 1996 – a year after it deregulated its wholesale market.
Though FERC regulates RTOs and ISOs in their transmission of electricity, ERCOT became an exception to the rule because it does not engage in interstate commerce.
In 1999, Texas lawmakers approved a state Senate bill that required the retail electricity market to become deregulated by 2002.
Since then, the market has remained independent and deregulated though ERCOT must follow NERC's reliability standards.
In the aftermath of the deadly storm in February, ERCOT has come under intense scrutiny as state lawmakers debate what changes to make.
Contributing: Jack Money, The Oklahoman; George Petras, Veronica Bravo, and Shawn Sullivan, USA TODAY