Afghanistan: Hurrying to a bad deal with the Taliban worse than no deal at all

The Biden administration is trying to rush through a comprehensive peace deal in Afghanistan before the upcoming U.S. troop pullout. But hurrying to a bad deal with the Taliban would be worse than no deal at all.

News leaked last week of the proposed agreement, which the administration is calling a “moonshot.” Secretary of State Anthony Blinken called on Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to show "urgent leadership" in reaching a comprehensive peace plan. 

The need for urgency is tied to an agreement made with the Taliban last year setting a May 1 deadline to remove the remaining 2,500 U.S. and 7,500 coalition troops.

So far, the Biden administration is sticking to the terms of the deal, but Blinken expressed concern that the Taliban could make "rapid territorial gains" in an expected spring offensive, absent an armistice agreement. Blinken envisions a United Nations-facilitated conference including representatives from the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and India to meet in Turkey “to discuss a unified approach to supporting peace in Afghanistan.” 

The U.S. investment in Afghanistan

The eight-page discussion draft for the agreement is ambitious, laying out the framework for a new Afghan constitution, establishing a transitional peace government with power-sharing arrangements with the Taliban, and outlining terms for a comprehensive cease-fire. The Taliban are reportedly studying the plan, but the Afghan government has not been receptive. Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh said his government would "never accept a bossy and imposed peace."

Given this last-ditch attempt to bring about an Afghan peace, it is fair to ask what the United States has accomplished in its 20-year engagement in that country. The initial objectives after the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were clear: Punish al-Qaida, overthrow the Taliban government that gave it sanctuary, and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a future center of global terrorism. The latter objective involved supporting the creation of a new government, helping build Afghanistan’s defense infrastructure, and aiding in the development of democratic institutions and the economy.

The opening military moves were astonishingly effective, displacing the Taliban regime within weeks using support to indigenous anti-Taliban resistance and direct engagement with coalition forces. The subsequent stability-building efforts worked so well, at least initially, that by 2005 House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi was able to argue that “the war in Afghanistan is over.”

But coalition troops remained in place through the Bush years, then the U.S. presence surged to 100,000 under President Barack Obama before settling back to around 8,400.

The Taliban were not defeated, Western-style civil society did not expand much beyond Kabul, and the nation-building effort dragged along at a cost of about $50 billion a year and more than 2,000 tragic American deaths.

President Donald Trump returned to first principles when he outlined an Afghanistan policy in which victory was narrowly defined as “crushing al-Qaida, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge.” Over his term, troop levels dropped to about 2,500. 

In essence, the American troop pullout has mostly already taken place, and while conditions in Afghanistan are not markedly better, they are not significantly worse, either. To put the Afghan troop levels in another perspective, there are about the same number of National Guard troops on security detail in the nation’s capital this spring. 

Biden and Afghanistan:Donald Trump’s unconditional retreat from Afghanistan leaves Joe Biden little choice

Creating a stable, centralized Afghan society was an objective that vexed the Soviet Union, which gave up after only 10 years. Our two decades of effort have done better, but it's still not enough. The reason is that the idea itself is flawed. Afghanistan, even in the more peaceful days of the monarchy, has always been a decentralized society of tribes and warlords, shifting political allegiances, ancient feuds and ingrained customs. Outsiders will never change that, and those who try inevitably learn the hard way.

Creating unity and peace in Afghanistan

Secretary Blinken desires a future Afghan government of "unity and inclusivity" but, in fact, he can have either one or the other. Including the opposition in a transition government will guarantee gridlock and conflict. And unfortunately, the most “unified” period of Afghanistan’s recent history was under Mullah Mohammad Omar’s brutal Islamic Emirate. The Taliban cannot be counted on to recognize boundaries in power sharing, because they still believe themselves to be the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Any deal they agree to will be a tactical move to achieve their 20-year strategic objective of removing foreign forces from Afghan soil.

They will then act in the same spirit as the North Vietnamese under the Paris Peace Accords, discarding the peace terms when they sense an opportunity to seize total power.

The hurry-up peace push presents a false dichotomy of either agreeing to a comprehensive plan or abandoning Afghanistan to its fate. But the United States should not legitimize the Taliban’s return to power, even in part, through this diplomatic process. Our country can still support the government in Kabul through intelligence coordination, providing airpower, logistic support and other means short of an overt troop presence, while reserving the right to intervene if the country is in duress.

Meanwhile, we could continue to give materiel and advisory support to the Afghan government, help broker trade deals and remain involved in more durable diplomatic efforts for peace. Giving the Taliban immediate entrée into the Afghan government would make this type of continued American assistance impossible and would hasten the onset of a new fundamentalist emirate once the threat of foreign intervention has been removed.

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In December 2011, then-Vice President Joe Biden stated, “The Taliban, per se, is not our enemy.” After a two-decade war, the mullahs may disagree. It is important that our 20-year commitment of billions of dollars and thousands of casualties not be squandered in pursuit of a false peace.

James S. Robbins, a member of USA TODAY's Board of Contributors and author of "This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive," has taught at the National Defense University and the Marine Corps University and served as a special assistant in the office of the secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter: @James_Robbins