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The 5 Elements of IoT
Security
Julien Vermillard - Sierra Wireless
Who am I?
Software Engineer Sierra Wireless
AirVantage.net cloud service
Eclipse IoT:
Leshan project lead
Wakaama and Californium committer
Twitter: @vrmvrm
Email: jvermillard@sierrawireless.com
Agenda
In the news
Hardware
OTA Upgrades
Secure Communication
Key Distribution
Cloud Security
Open Source IoT Infrastructure
In the news
“The killer toaster”
“The nightmare on connected home street”
“What’s wrong with connected devices”
HP Fortify 2014 IoT security report
Reviewed the most popular devices:
TVs, webcams, thermostats, power
outlets, sprinkler controllers,
hubs for controlling multiple devices,
door locks, home alarms,scales,
and garage door openers
90% collected personal data
70% used unencrypted network services
http://h20195.www2.hp.com/V2/GetDocument.aspx?docname=4AA5-4759ENW&cc=us&lc=en
Secure your hardware
Hardware security
Risks:
Rogue firmware
Invisible backdoor
Malicious certificate
Eavesdropping
Mitigation:
Secure storage
Secure boot
Drawbacks:
Vendor lock
Tivoization
Nest Example:
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Jin-Smart-Nest-Thermostat-A-Smart-Spy-In-Your-Home.pdf
You can’t secure
what you can’t update
High engineering and BoM cost!
Custom bootloader
Flash size
Flash & switch update
Firmware
V 1
Firmware
V 2
Bootloader
Reboot & Patch update
Firmware
Patch
Bootloader
Must be bulletproof
Upgrading is hard:
● NAND flash errors
● Unexpected power loss
● Network errors
● Unexpected incompatibilities
● Checksum, cryptographic signature
A 0.1% failure rate on a 1m fleet is 1000 bricked devices
Secure Communication
Cipher suite? Pre-shared key
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
Client and server have a common secret
Symmetric cryptography
Tampering the device or the server give you
access to all the future and past
communications
Secure communication is not cheap
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lwig-tls-minimal-01
+----------------------+-----------------+
| | DTLS |
| +--------+--------+
| | ROM | RAM |
+----------------------+--------+--------+
| State Machine | 8.15 | 1.9 |
| Cryptography | 3.3 | 1.5 |
| DTLS Record Layer | 3.7 | 0.5 |
+----------------------+--------+--------+
| TOTAL | 15.15 | 3.9 |
+----------------------+--------+--------+
Table 1: Memory Requirements in KB
Cipher suite? Public Key
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
Server and client don’t share private keys,
only public keys
Perfect forward secrecy: past communication
can’t be decrypted after secret compromission
X.509 Certificate
Chain-of-trust for validating identity!
No more credential provisioning
Used for HTTPS
Certificate: revocation checks
Revocation checking is still an issue in 2015:
Validity date checking: RTC? NTP?
More and more complexity on the device side:
CRL, OCSP, stapling
Hard fail? Soft fail? Certificate pinning?
Pre-shared key vs X.509?
PSK is lighter, can run on very small target
X.509 crypto is heavier: (EC)DH,ECDSA/RSA
PSK Infrastructure is simpler but weaker
(Hello SIM card key files)
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure is complex, but
can be outsourced
Key Distribution
Pre-shared key generation
Everything should be provisioned at factory?
Don’t move big plain text list of credentials
Don’t use stupid formulas:
password = MD5(IMEI + CARRIER_NOT_SO_SECRET)
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-
Solnik-Cellular-Exploitation-On-A-Global-Scale-The-Rise-
And-Fall-Of-The-Control-Protocol.pdf
Secret rotation
Be sure to be ready to change them ASAP
Don’t wait the next Heartbleed for doing it
Good practice:
Changing the factory credential during the 1st
communication
Key management protocols?
Enterprise PKI for X.509: CMP, OCSP
For PSK or X.509: Lightweight M2M bootstrap
LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell
Flash bootstrap
credentials
LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell
I only have bootstrap
credentials or I can’t
reach final server
LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell
POST /bs
Bootstrap Server
LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell
Write DM
URL & credentials
Bootstrap Server
LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell
DM ServerBootstrap Server
I have credential for
the DM server
LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell
DM ServerBootstrap Server
POST /rd
LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell
DM ServerBootstrap Server
Start managing the
device
Server Security
Why it’s mattering?
Risk:
Takeover of your whole device fleet
You are a juicy target
Mitigations:
More security (ex. 2 factor auth) than classical
web service
Collect only the necessary data
Isolate as much as possible web and devices
Now where I start?
Ask more time/budget?
The 5 elements of IoT security
Now you are part of the
70% unencrypted network services
Open-source to the rescue!
Eclipse IoT - Leshan
Lightweight M2M implementation in Java
A library for building:
bootstrap, and device management servers
Support DTLS PSK, RPK, (X.509 soon)
And also client for beefier devices or testing
Eclipse IoT - Leshan
Update firmware, software
Manage secrets (bootstrap)
Monitor and configure device
Can support custom object for applications
IPSO objects
Eclipse IoT - Wakaama
C implementation of Lightweight M2M
Focused on embedded
Bring your own IP stack
Bring your own DTLS implementation
Bootstrap supported
Eclipse IoT - Wakaama
You can receive packages for
firmware/software update
But you need to implement live re-flashing on
your platform
Known to be running on Linux, Arduino mega,
ARM Cortex processors
TinyDTLS | https://tindydtls.sf.net
MIT License, Eclipse proposal!
“Support session multiplexing in single-
threaded applications and thus targets
specifically on embedded systems.”
Examples for Linux, or Contiki OS
TinyDTLS
Supported ciphersuites:
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES128_CCM_8
Demo!
From Toolbox
To Jump start
Thanks!
Questions?
Contact me:
@vrmvrm
jvermillard@sierrawireless.com
Blog post
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Sign in: www.eclipsecon.org
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The 5 elements of IoT security

  • 1. The 5 Elements of IoT Security Julien Vermillard - Sierra Wireless
  • 2. Who am I? Software Engineer Sierra Wireless AirVantage.net cloud service Eclipse IoT: Leshan project lead Wakaama and Californium committer Twitter: @vrmvrm Email: jvermillard@sierrawireless.com
  • 3. Agenda In the news Hardware OTA Upgrades Secure Communication Key Distribution Cloud Security Open Source IoT Infrastructure
  • 4. In the news “The killer toaster” “The nightmare on connected home street” “What’s wrong with connected devices”
  • 5. HP Fortify 2014 IoT security report Reviewed the most popular devices: TVs, webcams, thermostats, power outlets, sprinkler controllers, hubs for controlling multiple devices, door locks, home alarms,scales, and garage door openers 90% collected personal data 70% used unencrypted network services http://h20195.www2.hp.com/V2/GetDocument.aspx?docname=4AA5-4759ENW&cc=us&lc=en
  • 7. Hardware security Risks: Rogue firmware Invisible backdoor Malicious certificate Eavesdropping Mitigation: Secure storage Secure boot Drawbacks: Vendor lock Tivoization Nest Example: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Jin-Smart-Nest-Thermostat-A-Smart-Spy-In-Your-Home.pdf
  • 8. You can’t secure what you can’t update
  • 9. High engineering and BoM cost! Custom bootloader Flash size
  • 10. Flash & switch update Firmware V 1 Firmware V 2 Bootloader
  • 11. Reboot & Patch update Firmware Patch Bootloader
  • 12. Must be bulletproof Upgrading is hard: ● NAND flash errors ● Unexpected power loss ● Network errors ● Unexpected incompatibilities ● Checksum, cryptographic signature A 0.1% failure rate on a 1m fleet is 1000 bricked devices
  • 14. Cipher suite? Pre-shared key TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Client and server have a common secret Symmetric cryptography Tampering the device or the server give you access to all the future and past communications
  • 15. Secure communication is not cheap https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lwig-tls-minimal-01 +----------------------+-----------------+ | | DTLS | | +--------+--------+ | | ROM | RAM | +----------------------+--------+--------+ | State Machine | 8.15 | 1.9 | | Cryptography | 3.3 | 1.5 | | DTLS Record Layer | 3.7 | 0.5 | +----------------------+--------+--------+ | TOTAL | 15.15 | 3.9 | +----------------------+--------+--------+ Table 1: Memory Requirements in KB
  • 16. Cipher suite? Public Key TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Server and client don’t share private keys, only public keys Perfect forward secrecy: past communication can’t be decrypted after secret compromission
  • 17. X.509 Certificate Chain-of-trust for validating identity! No more credential provisioning Used for HTTPS
  • 18. Certificate: revocation checks Revocation checking is still an issue in 2015: Validity date checking: RTC? NTP? More and more complexity on the device side: CRL, OCSP, stapling Hard fail? Soft fail? Certificate pinning?
  • 19. Pre-shared key vs X.509? PSK is lighter, can run on very small target X.509 crypto is heavier: (EC)DH,ECDSA/RSA PSK Infrastructure is simpler but weaker (Hello SIM card key files) X.509 Public Key Infrastructure is complex, but can be outsourced
  • 21. Pre-shared key generation Everything should be provisioned at factory? Don’t move big plain text list of credentials Don’t use stupid formulas: password = MD5(IMEI + CARRIER_NOT_SO_SECRET) https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14- Solnik-Cellular-Exploitation-On-A-Global-Scale-The-Rise- And-Fall-Of-The-Control-Protocol.pdf
  • 22. Secret rotation Be sure to be ready to change them ASAP Don’t wait the next Heartbleed for doing it Good practice: Changing the factory credential during the 1st communication
  • 23. Key management protocols? Enterprise PKI for X.509: CMP, OCSP For PSK or X.509: Lightweight M2M bootstrap
  • 24. LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell Flash bootstrap credentials
  • 25. LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell I only have bootstrap credentials or I can’t reach final server
  • 26. LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell POST /bs Bootstrap Server
  • 27. LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell Write DM URL & credentials Bootstrap Server
  • 28. LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell DM ServerBootstrap Server I have credential for the DM server
  • 29. LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell DM ServerBootstrap Server POST /rd
  • 30. LwM2M bootstrap in a nutshell DM ServerBootstrap Server Start managing the device
  • 32. Why it’s mattering? Risk: Takeover of your whole device fleet You are a juicy target Mitigations: More security (ex. 2 factor auth) than classical web service Collect only the necessary data Isolate as much as possible web and devices
  • 33. Now where I start?
  • 36. Now you are part of the 70% unencrypted network services
  • 38. Eclipse IoT - Leshan Lightweight M2M implementation in Java A library for building: bootstrap, and device management servers Support DTLS PSK, RPK, (X.509 soon) And also client for beefier devices or testing
  • 39. Eclipse IoT - Leshan Update firmware, software Manage secrets (bootstrap) Monitor and configure device Can support custom object for applications IPSO objects
  • 40. Eclipse IoT - Wakaama C implementation of Lightweight M2M Focused on embedded Bring your own IP stack Bring your own DTLS implementation Bootstrap supported
  • 41. Eclipse IoT - Wakaama You can receive packages for firmware/software update But you need to implement live re-flashing on your platform Known to be running on Linux, Arduino mega, ARM Cortex processors
  • 42. TinyDTLS | https://tindydtls.sf.net MIT License, Eclipse proposal! “Support session multiplexing in single- threaded applications and thus targets specifically on embedded systems.” Examples for Linux, or Contiki OS
  • 44. Demo!
  • 48. +1 0 -1 Sign in: www.eclipsecon.org Evaluate the sessions