Congressman: U.S. Land-Based Nuclear Weapons Need a Rethink | Opinion

For the past 20 years, the debate surrounding U.S. nuclear weapon policy has been stagnant, despite the fact that a nuclear exchange between the superpowers would leave a shattered world. Given recent reports from the U.S. Air Force regarding the staggering cost growth of the Sentinel program—a "mega-project" to replace the currently deployed 400 Minuteman III nuclear-armed ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—we can no longer let momentum alone march us down a $150 billion path that makes our country, and the world, fundamentally less safe.

Some, including the current administration, argue that the land-leg of our nuclear triad is absolutely necessary to maintain strategic deterrence as the most "responsive" leg of the triad. Many nuclear policy experts, including a former secretary of defense and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have compellingly argued the exact opposite. The common assumption is that nuclear deterrence, and particularly the land-leg of the triad, will only be used in a crisis, intentionally, and only after reasonable contemplation. Any student of history knows that in a crisis judgments are often rushed, clouded, and irrational—no matter who is in charge. Further, there is no other weapon in the U.S. arsenal that, if struck by an enemy, could result in the loss of up to 300 million innocent American lives, as a recent Princeton University Program on Science and Global Security (SGS) study concluded.

Despite these serious concerns, and sky-rocketing price tag, the Sentinel program has received broad support across administrations and on both sides of the aisle in Congress. Given this reality, the chances of cancelling the program outright are unfortunately slim. However, President Joe Biden and Secretary Lloyd Austin have the ability to reconsider some basic tenets of the current program that could not only save the American taxpayer a significant amount of their hard-earned money, but also directly address some of the concerns experts have warned about for decades.

• Reduce the total number of land-based ICBMs. The chances of launching all 400 Minuteman IIIs in the short timeline allotted are incredibly slim. The secretary of defense should task the commander of strategic command to determine the absolute minimum number of ground-based ICBMs needed, given some flexibility inherent in the current design regarding warhead employment.
• The Strategic Posture Commission concluded recently that the Defense Department should "pursue the feasibility of fielding some portion of the future ICBM force in a road mobile configuration." This does not mean driving nuclear-tipped ICBMs on semi-trucks around the United States. Instead, launcher-based ICBMs stored in secured vaults would only be put on alert if necessary. This option, if used as replacement for all, or some of the existing Minuteman III ICBMs, could significantly reduce the number of in-ground silos and launch control facilities—the main driver of the ballooning program costs of Sentinel—and could also address concerns with the constant high-alert posture of the existing system.
• The commission also concluded that in the near term, the department should be investing more in conventional munitions, as both Russia and China's Communist Party currently are out-manufacturing the U.S. If this trend continues, it could directly impact strategic stability in a future conflict. Efforts like Replicator look to address this mismatch going forward, but the fiscal year 2025 budget request makes cuts to both conventional platforms and weapons. If the Sentinel program continues to balloon, these reductions to conventional systems are likely to increase as the Pentagon's top-line is unlikely to grow significantly.
• There is broad agreement across nearly every nuclear policy expert that the submarine leg of the triad is the most survivable—and arguably the leg that would be most relied upon in an actual nuclear exchange. Instead of leaving more than 400 "sitting duck" targets in the heart of the United States to act as a sponge, would it not make more sense to take even half the current anticipated budget of the Sentinel program—around $70 billion—and invest it into another leg of the triad that is more operationally relevant?

These options are not exhaustive, but they are a good start. A world without nuclear weapons is a goal we should continue to strive for because a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore must never be fought. Until that can be achieved, we must have the moral fortitude to make decisions that get us closer to that goal, not push us to the brink of a catastrophic nuclear holocaust.

Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) is the Democratic leader of the House Armed Services Committee. He was the Chairman of the full committee from 2019 to 2023 and has served on the committee since 1997.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.