One of the peculiarities of U.S. history is that the major political parties have not significantly differed on foreign policy since the onset of the post-World War II order. In that time the West has been led by the United States from a posture that is fundamentally liberal—in the classic, not American, sense—and also moderate. As far as left-right divides go, the Democrats have not been inherently pacifist, nor have the Republicans been more aggressive abroad.
Indeed, it is the Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, for instance, that initiated and escalated the disastrous Vietnam War in the 1960s, despite ample evidence that the Domino Theory was wrong. Conversely, it was the Republican Richard Nixon who ended that war and famously opened diplomatic relations with China—a gamble given that country's hostile insularity then, and one that seemed to pay off.
This is further illustrated by the case of President George W. Bush. In his 2000 campaign, Bush adopted an almost isolationist stance, criticizing the Clinton Administration's "nation-building" efforts in places like Haiti. However, his presidency saw one of the most extensive nation-building endeavors in U.S. history, with the "Bush Doctrine" struggling to promote democracy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East. Despite his profound ideological differences with Bush in other areas, President Barack Obama, a Democrat and Bush's successor, essentially continued those policies.
Even more radical actions—the elder Bush's first Gulf War, Clinton's interventions in the Balkans—had considerable bipartisan support. None were truly surprising; mostly, US administrations from both sides did more or less what you might expect for a country that styled itself as the leader of a "rules-based order": it enforced those rules. For America's allies this was reassuring; for our rivals, America's predictability enabled a version of stability, making inadvertent escalation due to miscalculation or misperception far less likely.
Along the way, global mechanisms were established that provided structure and offered contexts for shoring up alliances and handling broader potential conflicts and crises on a variety of issues—from the World Trade Organization to the bodies of the United Nations to NATO to the meetings of the G7. None are perfect, but together they kept a lid on the worst possible excesses.
All of it was, in a messy way, a sort of Pax Americana. And all of it is in danger should former President Donald Trump be returned to the White House in November, which the troubles in President Joe Biden's campaign appear to make more likely. Both of us have attended a number of international conferences on geopolitics in recent weeks, including one in Yerevan at which we shared a panel on U.S. foreign policy. Wherever we went, we found fascination with the U.S. election—which in most cases was accompanied by trepidation, if not desperation.
What we are looking at is not a classic political dispute, as we suggest above. This is not about global leftists fearing a conservative U.S. leadership. Indeed, true conservatives are among the most trepidatious. It is instead a reflection of the sense that Trump is uniquely capricious in that he shares none of his predecessors' belief in the world order that the U.S. built.
Some, of course, still cling to the hope that Trump is mostly bluster, that he might once again draw his foreign policy team from traditional Republican elites, or that his worst instincts might be mollified with a kind word about the First Lady. We lean the other way: we anticipate substantial shifts in U.S. foreign policy under Trump.
In its second incarnation, a Trump administration will be far more transformational than the first. Trump will take steps to ensure the laws, institutions, and professional foreign policy class that constrained his most malign instincts and frustrated his worst designs are unable to do so again.
It is striking to even consider something as basic as the shift in mindsets that can be expected: From a paradigm blending values and interests to one of pure transactionalism; from multilateralism to bilateralism, as Trump detests alliances he cannot dominate; from practical policymaking to vengefulness, reversing any predecessors' policies he disagrees with, as seen with his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal; from an ally-focused instinct to one favoring despots; and from limited interventionism to near-isolationism.
Mainly, perhaps, and profoundly: From process-driven expertise to decisions based on instinct, ego, and emotion.
In current global conflicts, these shifts could have profound implications.
If the war in Gaza continues, Trump's administration would likely ease pressure on Israel, with concern for Palestinians virtually disappearing from the discourse of the U.S. administration. Trump could take severe action against the United Nations and other global institutions criticizing Israel, especially the International Criminal Court, should it follow through on plans to issue arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials. Then again, of course, Trump could also unpredictably change course.
Ukraine would face a drastic change, potentially losing its primary source of support. Forced to sue for peace, Ukraine might have to cede its eastern provinces to Russia. Trump could halt arms shipments, leaving Ukraine to rely entirely on Europe. Congress might in theory try to intervene, but the bar for forcing a president's hand is very high. The situation could become dire for Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky.
What can Ukraine do to mitigate the potential for disaster in a Trump era? Or indeed smaller countries like our Armenian hosts?
Armenia has long relied on Russia for support but has in recent years been executing a tricky pivot toward the United States and the West. But Trump admires authoritarian leaders like Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev, Armenia's aggressive neighbor, which could change the equation.
Options do exist. They include building a transactional case to win Trump's favor; strengthening alliances with countries like France and India; collaborating with Democrats, anticipating their return to power in 2028 or leveraging potential Democratic control of Congress. Mainly, it will be a period to be survived.
All over the world, these discussions are happening right now. Allies and adversaries are preparing for an era of unpredictability, where the familiar rules no longer apply.
Colonel (Ret.) Robert Hamilton heads Eurasia Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, has been a professor at the U.S. Army War College and served in a variety of diplomatic posts. Dan Perry is the former chief editor of the Associated Press in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, and the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem. Follow him at danperry.substack.com.
The views expressed in this article are the writers' own.
